President Donald Trump: Bracing for a longer Ukraine war
One of the mysteries of the Ukraine endgame is that President Donald Trump did not issue an executive order on January 20 withdrawing all support for Ukraine. That would have been the easiest way to end the war.
The conditions were propitious — Candidate Trump didn’t mince words that it was a hopeless war that cost the US dearly in treasure; he thought poorly of President Volodymyr Zelensky as a shameless free rider; he saw the war as impeding his foreign-policy priority of the US’ transition to a multipolar world order; and, he felt no compulsion to inherit ‘Biden’s war’.
But instead, Trump plunged himself with gusto into the Ukraine question, although Washington lacked the means to leverage Russia to compromise on its core interests in what Russian people regarded as an existential war.
Quite possibly, some of Trump’s advisors prevailed upon him to undertake the theatrical diplomatic effort on the basis of a flawed reading of the state of play in the war. Trump believed that western sanctions lethally weakened the Russian economy; that Russia’s casualty figures ran into hundreds of thousands and such a high level of attrition was unsustainable; that Zelensky would sign up on the dotted line; that an improvement in Russian-American relationship would be a ‘win-win’ with massive economic benefits accruing to both sides and so on.
But all these premises turned out to be wrong notions. Putin has steered the economy to a state of permanent western sanctions (which was the Soviet experience, too). Russian entrepreneurs have successfully replaced the fleeing western businesses in the wake of sanctions and will now resist any re-entry by the latter.
Russia’s casualty figures are much lower than the self-serving western estimates put it, as the high level of recruitment to the army suggests. Zelensky is bent on prolonging the war with support from European powers per Biden’s script to ‘Trump-proof’ the war. Europeans not only have a Plan B but have collaborators within the US some of who may even be in Trump’s team.
Suffice to say, Trump has been on a learning curve, as he began sensing that the Kremlin is determined to realise the objectives it had set for itself (as outlined in Putin’s historic speech last June at the foreign ministry). According to a Reuters report two days ago, “Putin wants a ‘written’ pledge by major Western powers not to enlarge the US-led NATO alliance eastwards — shorthand for formally ruling out membership to not only Ukraine and Georgia and Moldova and other former Soviet republics as well.”
“Russia also wants Ukraine to be neutral, some Western sanctions lifted, a resolution of the issue of frozen Russian sovereign assets in the West, and protection for Russian speakers in Ukraine” — per Reuters.
Europeans will scoff at such demands. Therefore, as things stand, a breakthrough at the Russia-Ukraine peace talks in Istanbul on June 2 seems unlikely. Unsurprisingly, Russia is pressing ahead with an offensive campaign in all directions, throwing in all its forces with a culmination planned for summer or early autumn.
The least bad option
Trump has three options under the circumstances. One is to simply refuse to own responsibility for the war and walk away for good. But then, can Trump deny his own part in it during 2016-2020, in his first term? While Trump administration identified its approach to foreign policy as ‘principled realism’, late Joseph Nye’s characterisation of Trump as an “idiosyncratic realist” was perhaps closer to the truth.
The official administration policy on Ukraine during Trump’s first term was a continuation of the policy pursued by the Obama administration. It recognised Crimea as part of Ukraine, condemned Russia’s occupation and eventual annexation annexation of the peninsula; it underscored Russia’s primary responsibility for the instigation, continuation and conduct of the conflict in eastern Ukraine; it even identified the Russian interference in Ukraine as part of a wider pattern of aggression towards other states and as proof of Moscow’s challenge to the fundamental principles of international order.
For these reasons, the Trump administration maintained that the US should help Ukraine to defend itself and should penalise Russia both through sanctions and diplomatic isolation (eg., membership of the G7). Curiously, shades of this thought process resurface even today occasionally in Trump’s Truth Social outbursts. Trump seems unaware he’s carrying a can of worms as his Ukraine legacy.
So, the second option today is to convey Trump’s dissatisfaction over Russia’s perceived intransigence in dictating terms for settlement and its alleged lack of interest in peace talks. Trump even hinted at Russia’s hidden agenda to conquer Ukraine. Trump is hinting at punishing Russia both through sanctions and supplying weapons to Ukraine. German chancellor Friedrich Merz’s provocative announcement of giving long-range weapons to Zelensky was probably green lighted by some people in Trump’s team. After all, Merz is no stranger to Wall Street.
However, this is recipe for an extremely dangerous NATO – Russia confrontation. If long range German missiles hit Russia, Russia will retaliate in a way that could potentially cripple NATO’s operational readiness in a hypothetical war. Belarus State Secretary of Security Council Alexander Volfovich has said Oreshnik missile system is “planned to be stationed in Belarus by the end of the year. The locations for its deployment have already been determined. Work is under way.” The spectre of World War III may seem bit of a stretch, but Trump will have to consider the dangers of climbing the escalation ladder, which could destroy his MAGA presidency.
Washington has no means to intimidate the Kremlin. The bottom line is, Trump is actually left with only a third option, the least bad option — viz., walking away from the Ukraine conflict at this point and return when the war has been lost and won, possibly by the end of the year. This will not damage Trump’s reputation.
Trump may already be displaying his credentials as ‘peacemaker president’ if the US-Iran talks, which seem to be making progress, results in a nuclear deal. Besides, US-Russia normalisation needs more time to gain traction. Senator Lindsey Graham’s hard-hitting sanctions bill against Russia with 81 co-sponsors in the senate signals that Russia is a very toxic subject in the US domestic politics.
Also, Russia-Ukraine talks is only one track. The Russians have sensitised Trump’s team that while Moscow engages with Kiev, the root cause of the war — absence of a European security architecture — still remains to be addressed, which is something that only Russia and the US can work out jointly. The US shouldn’t shirk its responsibility, being both the original instigator of NATO expansion and sponsor of the Ukraine war.
The reaction by the US special envoy for Ukraine Keith Kellogg has been positive when he told ABC News in an interview that the US understands that it is a matter of national security for Russia that NATO may stop accepting new Eastern European countries into its ranks — ie., not only Ukraine but Moldova and Georgia as well.
Kellogg said he considered the Russian side’s concerns to be justified. He did not rule out the possibility of reaching an agreement during negotiations between the US and Russia. This is a big step forward.