A bus carrying Palestinians released from Israeli prisons is greeted by a crowd outside the Nasser hospital, Gaza Strip, Oct 13, 2025
The overnight visit by Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar to India has been rather thin on the ground. Although this has been his first visit to India as Foreign Minister, and notwithstanding Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ‘hands-on’ approach to the India-Israel relationship which has seen a huge upswing during his years in power through the past 11 years, it comes as a surprise that he was not received by the PM. One plausible explanation could be that PM has his hands full what with the crucial state election in Bihar, which has traditionally been a weathercock in India’s national politics.
Couldn’t the visit of Sa’ar have been scheduled in such a way that a meeting with PM was possible? The only explanation is that the Israeli dignitary’s consultation was hastily arranged. What happened for such an unseemly haste for Sa’ar to rush to Delhi?
The more one runs a fine comb through the visit, the more it seems that Sa’ar actually came to discuss Gaza situation even as the crucial upcoming template of the second stage of the Gaza Peace Plan on the deployment of the international force is coming up.
The MEA readout simply says, “FM Sa’ar shared Israel’s perspective and views on developments in West Asia and the Gulf. EAM expressed India’s support for the Gaza Peace Plan, welcomed the return of hostages and expressed hope that the Peace Plan paves way for a durable and lasting solution.”
Perhaps, some forensic work is needed here to dig deeper. To be sure, Delhi is aware of Washington moving to launch a UN draft resolution in the Security Council seeking mandate for the creation of an International Security Force (ISF) for Gaza.
According to Axios, which has seen the relevant document, the duration of the ISF is for a period of two years with the possibility of extension. The ISF will not perform a peacekeeping mission but will instead focus on ensuring the security of the border sector, with Israel and Egypt protecting the Gaza population and humanitarian corridors, as well as preparing new Palestinian police forces.
The ISF’s mandate also includes the disarming of Hamas, which is of course the most sensitive work of its entire mission. According to the US draft resolution, ISF will be expected to stabilise the situation in the Gaza sector by means of demilitarisation of the region, including through destruction and prevention of reconstruction of military, terrorist and offensive infrastructure, as well as clamp down on the supply of weapons to unsustainable armed formations. In sum, this is a proactive mission with a difference whose performance will be critical to Israel’s security and the viability of the Gaza Plan itself.
The deployment of the first units of ISF in the Gaza sector is planned in January, Axios reported quoting an unnamed US official. The ISF will exercise their mandate under a single command, “closely cooperating and consulting with representatives of Egypt and Israel.”
Now comes the cutting edge
According to reports in Ynet and the Guardian, the countries whose troops will join the ISF under the common command of Egypt could potentially include troops from Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Turkey and Pakistan. Accordingly, all these countries participated in the recent Istanbul conference hosted by Turkey to discuss the Gaza situation.
The Security Council discussion on the US draft is expected to start in the near future. Trump is in a hurry to get going with the proposed Council of Peace with himself as its viceroy with full powers to coordinate the recovery process and management of the destroyed territory in Gaza in accordance with a comprehensive plan.
Of course, Israel is not fully on board the plan to deploy ISF in Gaza. On the other hand, Hamas, as can be expected, is interested in an early deployment of the ISF, hoping that would be a check on the Israeli occupation.
According to a ‘scoop’ by Ynet, the Israeli news website and online outlet for the Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper, officials of the Israeli Ministry of Defence made a startling disclosure a week ago during a closed-door briefing for members of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee about Pakistan’s inclusion in the ISF.
In a recent commentary, Ynet assessed that “Importantly, the United States is not seeking a Security Council resolution—certainly not under Chapter VII, which would authorise the use of force—but rather a vaguely worded document that would allow the council to give its backing and endorsement to the formation of a stabilisation force. This force would be established by the US in coordination with Arab and Muslim countries… it appears there are, for now, no elements that are fundamentally problematic from Israel’s perspective—except for one: the clause concerning the disarmament of Hamas and other Gaza-based terrorist groups.”
The rushed visit to Delhi by Minister Sa’ar can be put in perspective. He would have sensitised Delhi that Israel is not in a position to dictate the composition of the IDF. Interestingly, the only other meeting Sa’ar had in Delhi was with the National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, India’s ace Pakistan hand.
Pakistan enjoys strong support from Saudi Arabia with which it is now inextricably bonded with a defence pact. At any rate, the US is in the driving seat here and Trump is leaning on Turkey to assume the lead role, and Turkey has very friendly relations with Pakistan (and rather unfriendly equations with Delhi.)
It has been reported previously that Trump is an admirer of Pakistan’s Field Marshal Asim Munir and there was even some media speculation that a Pakistani role in the stabilisation of Gaza already figured in the cogitations between the two statesmen. In the final analysis, the inclusion of Pakistan in the ISF carries the imprimatur of Trump. And it will be an uphill task now for Delhi or any other world capital to do anything about it.
Indeed, Israel opposes the very idea of any UN involvement, which, it fears, will affect its military’s engagement rules in Gaza. Israel has reason to worry that the reliance on the United Nations as the source of authority for establishing the stabilisation force and the Board of Peace, which could give the UN influence over the mandate language and the rules of engagement granted to the force.
This is the eleventh hour before a finalised version of the US document will be ready and a Security Council mandate is sought, spelling out the details of countries that will constitute the ISF. Israel would be counting on India to pull all stops to block Pakistan’s inclusion in the IDF.
The role of Russia as a permanent member of the Security Council becomes important in this context. But then, Pakistan has been an active partner in the Russian initiatives in the Security Council aimed at restraining Israel in its destructive war in Gaza.
Also, Russia will have to take into consideration China’s stance with which it coordinates in the UN almost as a matter of routine in the recent years. It is highly improbable that China will be party to Pakistan’s exclusion.
The point is, much as India vilifies Islamabad as the champion of international terrorism, Pakistan also happens to be a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the 2025–26 term and has been appointed Chair of the UNSC 1988 (Taliban) Sanctions Committee for 2025, and Vice Chair of the UNSC 1373 Counter-Terrorism Committee for 2025, along with Russia and France.
Over and above all that, Pakistan has a highly disciplined and professional army, which enjoys international prestige, especially in the Middle East region, and is capable of doing a great job professionally in the Gaza mission, which is fraught with big security challenges.
Buck stops at Oval Office
Delhi has cause to worry that the buck stops at the Oval Office. Indeed, with all the humiliation and bitterness that India has undergone in the recent months at the hands of the US officials on the oil imports from Russia, it is too much to expect PM to ask Trump for a favour, which is what PM Benjamin Netanyahu would have expected in happier circumstances. Delhi also has to be wary of Trump seizing the opportunity to propose mediation on India-Pakistan issues.
That leaves EAM tangoing with his American counterpart Marco Rubio who is a rising star in Trump’s policymaking apparatus currently. EAM has been meeting Rubio oft and on. Their last meeting was in Malaysia just a week ago.
But even here, Rubio has his limitations when Trump is directly involved. In this case, Trump has a role for himself in the future developments in Gaza. If the Gaza security situation turns critical in the coming months due to the ineptness of the IDF, Trump’s prestige will be dented internationally.
Make no mistake, the IDF deployment will be for the long haul. And don’t be surprised if an extended Pakistani military presence in Gaza, not far from Tel Aviv, eventually morphs into an Israel-Pakistan relationship of some sort. At the very least, a cordial working relationship between the military establishments of the two countries will become an operational necessity, given the centrality that Tel Aviv attaches to Gaza’s security climate, which is indeed an existential issue for Israel.
Israeli diplomacy is highly pragmatic and skilful in handling such tricky situations. Certainly, the fact that Israel has no diplomatic ties with Pakistan will not stop it from cultivating the Pakistani contingent in the IDF once the rubber hits the road. And Israel has a matching counterpart in this respect in Field Marshal Munir.
Trump will only be happy with an informal ‘normalisation’ of between Islamabad and Tel Aviv. Who knows, if things go well, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner may appear some day in Rawalpindi in a not too distant future, acting on Trump’s instructions to resuscitate the moribund Abraham Accords.