The world order’s transformation to multipolarity is a work in progress with the variables at work, but its outcome will be largely determined by the alignment of the three big powers — the United States, Russia and China. Historically, the ‘triangle’ appeared as the lid came off the Sino-Soviet schism in the 1960s and a ferocious public acrimony erupted between Moscow and Beijing, which prompted the Nixon administration to moot Henry Kissinger’s secret mission to Beijing to meet up face to face with Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou En-lai and, hopefully, work out a modus vivendii to jointly counter Russia.
Revisiting the Sino-Soviet schism, it is well understood by now that the US-Soviet – China triangle never really ran the course that Kissinger had envisaged. Kissinger’s failure to consolidate the opening of relations with China was partly due to his loss of power by January 1977 and, in a systemic sense, inevitably so, given the complexity of the boiling cauldron of Sino-Soviet schism where ideology mixed with politics and geopolitics — and realpolitik.
While the western mythology was that the US built up the foundations of China’s rise, historiography points in another direction, namely, that Beijing always had in mind the dialectics at work and even as a degree of compatibility of Chinese and American interests in checking the expansion of Soviet power existed, Beijing was determined to avoid military conflict with the Soviet Union and concentrated its attention on improving its tactical position within the US-Chinese-Soviet triangle.
On its part, the Soviet Union also consistently promoted increased exchanges with China despite the bitter acrimony and even military clashes with a view to undercut perceived advantages the US derived from the Sino-Soviet split — and even sought to persuade China to accept the military and territorial status quo in Asia.
In fact, to retard Sino-US cooperation against them in the early 1970s, the Soviets offered at one point to modify their territorial claims along their border, to sign non-aggression pacts and / or agreements prohibiting the use of force, to base Sino-Soviet relationship on the five principles of peaceful co-existence, and to restore high-level contacts, including party ties, in the interests of their common opposition to the US.
If China largely ignored these overtures, it was almost entirely due to the great turbulence in its internal politics. Suffice to say, no sooner than Mao, the Soviet Union’s nemesis, died in September 1976 (and the curtain descended on the Cultural Revolution), Moscow followed up quickly with several gestures, including Brezhnev sending a message of condolence (the first CPSU message to China in a decade), followed by another Party message in October congratulating the newly-elected CCP Chairman Hua Guofeng, and shortly thereafter in November sending their chief negotiator for border talks Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev back to China in an attempt to resume the border talks. But, again, if nothing came of it, that was because of China’s invasion of Vietnam and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan soon thereafter in 1980.
Indeed, looking back, the main legacy of the 1970s viewed through the prism of the US-China-Russia ‘triangle’ was the reorientation of China’s defence policy and its geopolitical realignment with the West. China made no contribution significantly to weaken the Soviet Union or to aggravate the stagnation and brewing crisis in the Soviet political economy.
Meanwhile, the Sino-US differences over Taiwan and other issues had reemerged by 1980-1982, compelling China to reassess its foreign policy strategy, which manifested in Beijing’s announcement in 1982 of its “independent” foreign policy — plainly put, an attempt to rely less explicitly on the US as a strategic counterweight to the Soviet Union — and the move to open “consultative talks” with Moscow, and a growing receptiveness towards the numerous pending Soviet overtures for bilateral exchanges (in sports, cultural and economic areas, etc), the overall direction being to reduce tensions with the Soviets and increase the room for manoeuvre for Beijing within the China-US-Soviet triangle.
Indeed, a broader detente between China and the Soviet Union had to wait till the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan following the Geneva Accords signed in April 1988. Nonetheless, a basic change in the Sino-Soviet relations through the 1980s appeared, which included regular scheduled summit meetings; resumption of cooperative ties between the CCP and the CPSU; Beijing’s acceptance of the pending Soviet proposals for non-aggression / non-use of force; and resumption of Sino-Soviet border questions at vice-foreign minister level.
Washington could sense the shift in Chinese policy directions vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Notably, reviewing the marked shift in the Chinese strategy, a CIA assessment noted:
“More recently, Moscow followed Brezhnev’s call in 1982 for improved relations with China with a halt in most authoritative Soviet statements critical of China. When Sino-Soviet discussions resumed in October 1982, Soviet media cut back sharply on criticism of China. And they have remained restrained on this subject, although occasional polemic exchanges marked Sino-Soviet coverage at the time of Premier Zhao Ziyang’s visit to the United States in January 1984. Moscow has continued to be critical of China through the Soviet-based clandestine radio Ba Yi… China for its part has continued criticism of Soviet foreign policy, although past attention to Soviet “revisionist” internal policies has all but disappeared since China’s own economic policies have been significantly changed after Mao’s death.”
Succinctly put, with CPSU General Secretary Gorbachev consolidating power circa late 1988 by his election to the chairmanship of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet and on a parallel track, Deng had outmaneuvered political rivals and become China’s paramount leader by 1978 — and had launched the Boluan Fanzheng program to restore political stability, rehabilitate those persecuted during the Cultural Revolution, and reduce ideological extremism — the door had opened for the two erstwhile adversaries to enter the rose garden of reconciliation.
Significantly, the timing of Gorbachev’s visit to Beijing to meet up with Deng in 1989 was far from ideal by virtue of the Tiannenmen Square incidents, but neither side proposed to postpone or reschedule the meeting. Such was the intensity of their mutual desire for reconciliation.
Today, the above résumé has become necessary when we assess the future directions of the Trump administration’s China policies. The common perception is that Trump is attempting to create a wedge between Putin’s Russia and Xi Jinping’s China with a view to isolate the latter and thwart it from surpassing the US. But there is no shred of evidence available hinting at the potential for decoupling Russia from China.
All the signs are to the contrary in the direction of the steady integration of the two countries. Last week, the Kremlin announced a visa-free regime for Chinese citizens to visit Russia. Interestingly, this was a reciprocal move. FT reported recently that a Chinese businessman has been given equity in Russia’s biggest manufacturer of drones which supplies the military — in the first known collaboration in the area of defence industry.
With the Power of Siberia 2 on the anvil, China’s dependence on Russia for its energy security will increase further. Russia’s foreign trade is undergoing a profound shift, with China replacing the EU as Russia’s main trading partner. Overall, Sino-Russian relations are closer today than they have been in decades.
On the other hand, there is no credible suggestion that the Trump administration is preparing for a war with China. Japan under its new leadership is whistling in the dark.
So, what is on Trump’s mind? In his revolutionary agenda for the remaking of the new world order, Trump aims at a strategic concord between the US on one side and Russia and China on the other. The recent US National Security Strategy strongly points in that direction, too. The implications of this revolutionary thinking for multipolarity are going to be profound — for partners such as India or allies like Japan or Germany alike.